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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JULIA LEE ASKEW,

]
>
Plaintiff and Appellant, ]
i

vs.

Appeals No. 930537-CA
Priority No. 15

PAUL HARDMAN,
Defendant and Appellee,
STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by applying the

multi-factored test mandated by the Utah Supreme Court in Gold
Standard v. American Barrack Resources, Inc., 805 P.2d 164 (Utah
1990), in ruling that the insurer's claim file was prepared in
anticipation of litigation? If so, has Askew demonstrated that the
likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to
undermine confidence in the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.,
817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
II.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding

Robert Harmon as a witness where the probative value of the
testimony was outweighed by the danger that insurance would be
injected into the litigation, thereby prejudicing Hardman, and

where

the

testimony

demonstrated

that

would

the

be

cumulative?

likelihood

of

a

If

so, has Askew

different

outcome

is

sufficiently high as to undermine confidence in the verdict.
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch,, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to
risk the injection of insurance and possibly a mistrial on the last
day of trial by precluding Askew from introducing testimony that
neither she nor her representatives took the photographs of the
fence? If so, has Askew demonstrated that the likelihood of a
different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine confidence
in the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah
1991).
DETERMINATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDINANCES AND RULES.

PROVISIONS,

STATUTES,

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), attached as Exhibit "N".
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-38(3)(1988), attached as Exhibit "N".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case was tried to a jury. The Order of Judgment entered
after trial provided:
Interrogatory Number 1 of the special verdict asked the
question, "Was the Defendant, Paul Hardman, negligent",
to which the jury answered "No." The special verdict was
signed and dated by the jury foreperson, Richard K.
Johnson, January 15, 1993. The jury was polled and it was
determined that their verdict was unanimous.

2

R. 1711-1712. The jury apparently concluded that the accident was
caused by:

(1) the criminal acts of unidentified trespassers

combined with (2) the negligence of Kevin Butts in exceeding the
speed limit, driving too fast for existing conditions, failing to
heed the traffic signs, failing to keep a proper lookout, and
failing to exercise due care under the circumstances.
STATEMENT OP PACTS
1.

This case arose when an automobile in which Askew was

riding as a passenger collided with a horse owned by Hardman on
State Road 68 near Camp Williams, Utah County, State of Utah. The
accident occurred on November 20, 1989, at approximately 7:20 p.m.
2.

The horse that was involved in the collision was being

kept in Hardman's winter pasture with approximately 13 to 14 other
horses owned by Hardman. (Hardman Transcript, p. 61, Exhibit "G")
Hardman1s winter pasture is located over one mile to the northeast
of his home across State Road 68.

(Id. at pp. 6-9, 38;

See Defendant's Exhibit #6, Exhibit "P" (Hardman's home is outlined
in red marker just to the west of S.R. 68. The winter pasture is
outlined in red to the northeast of Hardman*s home.))

The winter

pasture is separated from State Road 68 by Camp Williams, a
military camp operated by the Utah National Guard, and a 30 acre
hayfield.
"P") .

(Hardman Depo., pp. 17-18, 104-05, Exhibit "E"; Exhibit

The winter pasture is approximately 80 acres in size.
3

size.

(Hardman Depo. , p. 47, Exhibit "E").

The feed in the winter

pasture was plentiful in late November of 1989 when this accident
occurred.

(Hardman Transcript, pp. 119-122, Exhibit "G").

3. Hardman moves his horses to the winter pasture every fall
and keeps them fenced in the winter pasture until about February of
the following year.

(Hardman Depo., p. 16, Exhibit "E").

The

fences of the winter pasture are inspected and mended before the
horses are put in the pasture each fall.

(Hardman Transcript, p.

96, Exhibit "G").
4.

In the fall of 1989, Hardman moved his horses into the

winter pasture about three weeks before the accident of this case.
(Id. at 65; Hardman Depo., p. 39, Exhibit "E"). Before moving his
horses into the pasture, Hardman hired two men, Doug Smith and
Darrell Allred, to reconstruct and/or repair the barbed wire fence
and posts which surrounded the pasture.

(Hardman Transcript, p.

24, Exhibit "G"; Smith Transcript, pp. 4-5 and 14, Exhibit "J").
This work was performed approximately one to two weeks before the
horses were moved into the pasture. (Hardman Depo., pp. 39 an 182,
Exhibit "E").

Smith spent two full days repairing the fence to the

winter pasture.

(Smith Transcript, p. 5, Exhibit "J").

When the

work was finished, the fence surrounding the winter pasture was in
good repair and adequate to fence Hardman's horses.

(Hardman

Transcript, pp. 53 and 124, Exhibit "G"; Smith Transcript p. 6,
4

Exhibit "J").

When Smith and Allred completed the fencing work,

the height of the top wire on the north side of the pasture was
from 3 1/2 to 4 feet and the lower wire was from 18 inches to 2
feet in height.

(Smith Transcript, p. 8, Exhibit "J").

5. The fence along the north side of the pasture in the area
where the horses escaped was a two strand barbed wire fence.
(Hardman Transcript, pp. 14, 26, 28, Exhibit "G") .

Hardman used

more than two strands, three to five strands, of barbed wire in
sections of the fence where there were canals, hills or the contour
of the ground otherwise required that more than two strands be used
to fill in gaps in the fence line.

(Id. at pp. 12-13, 78 and 80-

81) .
6.

Hardman's horses have never escaped from his pastures as

a result of stepping over, jumping over, or pushing through his
barbed wire fence. (Id. at 112; Hardman Depo., pp. 10, 69-85,
Exhibit "E").

In the 15 years that Hardman has kept horses, there

have only been two occasions where his horses have escaped from the
winter pasture.

(Hardman Transcript, pp. 11-13 and 24-25, Exhibit

"K"; Hardman Depo. pp. 10, 69-85, Exhibit "E").

The first occasion

was in 1987 or 1988 when the river that adjoins the winter pasture
was being dredged allowing the water to drop and the horses to
escape through the river bed.
Exhibit "E") .

(Hardman Depo., pp. 10, 69-85,

The other occasion was in the fall of 1989,
5

approximately two weeks before the accident, when a section of
fence along the winter pasture was torn down by poachers.
Transcript, pp. 11-13 and 24-25, Exhibit "K").

(Hardman

On both of these

occasions, the horses that escaped the pasture were found in the
field directly north of the winter pasture; the horses did not find
their way onto State Road 68. (Id. at 11-13, 24-25; Hardman Depo.,
pp. 10, 69-85, Exhibit "E").
7.

Before the accident of this case, Hardman repaired the

section of fence on the north side of the winter pasture two to
three times in the fall season of 1989 because of trespassers and
vandals knocking the fence down.
Exhibit "K").

(Hardman Transcript, pp. 10, 11,

Horses were not in the winter pasture the first time

the fence in that area was observed down.

(Id. at 14) .

As

previously stated, the horses walked out of the winter pasture on
only one of the two or three occasions when the fence was
vandalized. (Id. at pp. 11-13 and 24-25).
8. During the time that his horses are in the winter pasture,
Hardman and his wife, Lora, check the horses to determine their
location at least twice a day from their home using binoculars.
(Hardman Depo, pp. 95-96 Exhibit "E"; Deposition of Lora Hardman,
pp. 38-39, Exhibit "0"; R. 735-739.) Hardman also physically went
out and

inspected

the fences surrounding

6

the winter pasture

everyday in the two weeks before the accident. (Hardman Transcript,
p. 150, Exhibit "G")•
9. In a further effort to discourage trespassing, Hardman and
his wife report incidents of trespassing to the County Sheriff.
(Hardman Depo., pp. 119-120, 224, Exhibit "E"). "No trespassing"
signs are posted on the fence to the winter pasture, and "no
hunting" signs are posted prior to hunting season.
Transcript, pp. 22, 130, 148, Exhibit "G") .

(Hardman

The gates of the

winter pasture are kept closed and locked, and trespassers are
asked to leave the premises whenever they are found on Hardman's
property. (R. 700-701.)
10.
pasture

The only access to the property next to the winter
is through

a guard gate at Camp Williams.

Transcript, pp. 129-30, Exhibit "G").

(Hardman

Camp Williams posts a guard

at the gate 24 hours a day and will allow the public to enter Camp
Williams' property to go fishing on the Jordan River if they
register with the guard.

(Id.).

On several occasions before the

accident, Hardman and his wife contacted personnel from Camp
Williams to make them aware of trespassing and to request that they
take measures to discourage trespassing.

(Jd. at 19; Hardman

Depo., p. 22-26, Exhibit "E"). Camp Williams has orders to stop
anyone attempting to enter its property through the guard gate and

7

to notify persons of the boundaries of Camp Williams property and
that they are not to enter private property. (Id.)*
11. The other three roads that lead to the winter pasture are
closed to traffic with gates that are kept locked.

(Hardman

Transcript, pp. 21 and 128-30, Exhibit "G"; Exhibit "P") . A deep
cement ditch runs through the hayfield to the west of the winter
pasture which prevents vehicles from driving through the hayfield
to the winter pasture.
12.

(Id.)

At approximately 4:30 p.m. on the day of the accident,

within three hours of when the accident occurred, Hardman visually
inspected the section of fence that had been let down on the north
side of the winter pasture and observed that the fence was in good
repair and adequate to hold the horses in the pasture.

(Hardman

Transcript, pp. 150, 155, Exhibit "G"; Hardman Transcript, Rebuttal
Testimony, pp. 2-4, 6; Exhibit MR") . Hardman also saw at that time
that his horses were in the pasture. (R. 736).
13.

Hardman learned of the accident when he arrived home on

the evening of November 2 0 and saw police cars and ambulances on
S.R. 68 near his home. (Hardman Depo., p. 57, Exhibit "E").

When

Hardman learned that his horse had been involved in the accident,
he communicated to the investigating police officer that hunters or
poachers had probably let his fence down which allowed his horses
to escape from the winter pasture.
8

(Hardman Transcript, p. 4,

Exhibit "K").

Hardman's comment to the investigating officer was

based on his prior experience with trespassers vandalizing his
fences and his knowledge that his horses were securely fenced in
the pasture and could not escape unless vandals tore down the
fence. (Id. at 4-5) .
14.

On the morning following the accident of this case, at

approximately 7:00 a.m., Hardman went down to the winter pasture to
determine where his horse escaped from the pasture.
Transcript, p. 9, Exhibit
Exhibit "E").

(Hardman

lf

G"; Hardman Deposition, pp. 94-95,

Hardman observed that a section of the fence on the

north side of the pasture had been let down. (Hardman Transcript,
pp. 15-16, Exhibit "G").

Upon closer inspection, Hardman observed

that the strands of barbed wire on the north fence line had been
unwound from three of the fence posts near the northwest corner of
the winter pasture and were lying on the ground on the inside of
the pasture.

(Id. at 15-16 and 151-52; Hardman Deposition, pp.

108-09 and 112-114, Exhibit "E"). The wires of the fence were not
broken or cut. (Hardman Depo., p. 106, Exhibit "E").

Hardman also

observed deer entrails (the "guts" of a deer) that had recently
been killed and several magpie birds feeding on the entrails in the
area very near where the fence had been let down.

(Id.; R. 736).

Hardman further observed tire tracks located between two of the

9

fence posts on the north side of the pasture where the fence had
been let down.
15.

(Hardman Transcript, pp. 91-93, Exhibit "G").

Based on his observations, Hardman determined that the

fence had been let down by unidentified trespassers, possibly deer
poachers, since there was a recent deer kill and tire tracks. (R.
736.) The fact that the fence had been unwound, not cut or broken,
and was lying on the inside of the pasture was another clear
indication to Hardman that unidentified trespassers let down his
fence and allowed the horses to escape. (Hardman Depo. , pp. 106114, Exhibit "E").
16.

After Hardman saw that the fence had been let down, he

immediately reported the incident to the Utah County Sheriff's
office. (R. 311-312; Hardman Depo., pp. 111-12, Exhibit "E") .
Jerry Monson is the Deputy from the County Sheriff's office who
responded to Hardman's call. (Monson Transcript, p. 5, Exhibit
"L").

Monson prepared a detailed report for the Sheriff's office

of the incident. (R. 311-312.)

Monson noted in his report that

Hardman had reported "hunters knocking down his fence, causing his
horses to get out on the highway." (Id.)

Monson further reported

that he "responded to scene with the RP [Reporting

Party/Hardman]

and observed where the fence was down." (Id.) The report also
stated that "[i]t appeared someone had knocked the fence down with
a full size pick-up, as there was old tire tracks near the fence."
10

(Id.)-

Monson testified that he observed a pile of deer entrails

in the vicinity of where the fence was down.
Transcript, p. 12, Exhibit "L").

(Id.; Monson

The fact that the entrails were

on the ground for Monson to observe, and had not been eaten by
other animals, indicated to Monson that the deer had recently been
poached. (Id. at 11-12).
17.

Under the section of his report regarding action taken,

Monson wrote, "RP [Reporting Party/Hardman] wanted to show R/D
[Reporting Deputy] the fence because he is afraid of being suied
[sic] for having his horse cause an accident." (R. 311-312.)
Monson testified at trial about how Hardman told him the morning
after the accident that the cause of the accident was not Hardman's
fault.
18.

(Monson Transcript, p. 18, Exhibit "L").
In addition to reporting the incident to the Utah County

Sheriff's office, Hardman also reported the incident to Robert
Harmon, an insurance adjuster from Utah Farm Bureau Insurance
Company, on the morning following the accident. (Hardman Depo., p.
112, Exhibit "E") .

On that same morning, Robert Harmon drove to

the winter pasture in the area where the fence had been let down.
(Harmon Depo., p. 6, Exhibit "Q").

Harmon testified in his

deposition that he observed in the pasture next to the fence that
had been let down deer entrails from a recent deer kill.
7, 10-12).

(Id. at

He also testified to observing barbed wire from the
11

fence near the northwest corner of the pasture lying on the ground
toward the inside of the pasture. (Id. at 7, 8, 33). Harmon took
photographs which showed that section of the fence that had been
let down, the location of the wires and posts, and the condition of
the fence.

(Id. at 13, 20-35). He testified that the remainder of

the fence line was secure other than the area he photographed.
(Id. at 37).
19.

The automobile in which Askew was riding as a passenger

was being driven by Kevin Butts.

(Butts' Deposition, pp. 12 and

13, Exhibit "S" (Kevin Butts' deposition was read to the jury at
trial.))

Kevin Butts passed a 55 m.p.h. speed sign and a sign

warning of deer "next two miles" on S.R.68 about one mile prior to
impact.

(Id. at 10) . Kevin Butts estimated that he was travelling

65 m.p.h. at the time of the collision.

(Id. at 20).

Jim Brierly

was the investigating officer for the Utah Highway Patrol who was
asked to calculate the speed of Butts' vehicle at the time of the
collision.

(Brierly Depo., p. 7, Exhibit "T").

Brierly conducted

a highway drag analysis based on Butts' skid marks and determined
Butts' speed at the time of the collision at 72 m.p.h.

(Id. at

19).
20. Kevin Butts, who was travelling south on S.R. 68, further
testified that he did not see the horse prior to impact, even
though the horse was hit in its left rear in the center of the
12

southbound lane as it was traveling south along State Road 68.
(Butts' Depo., pp. 20, 23, Exhibit "S"; Guest Depo., pp. 20-27,
Exhibit

lf lf

U ) . Amanda Hardman, Hardmanfs 20 year old daughter,

testified as follows regarding Kevin Butts representations to her
after the accident: "he had been driving down the road, and he
looked up and saw horses or horses's hooves, I donft remember
which, and then he collided with a horse."

(Amanda Hardman Depo.,

p. 7, Exhibit "V"). Kevin Butts told his father on the night of
the accident that he had been looking at Askew trying to calm her
down as they were riding in his Camaro. (Larry Butts Depo., p. 18,
Exhibit "W"). Askew was upset due to an argument she had with her
mother before leaving her house with Kevin Butts.

(Kevin Butts

Depo., pp. 13, 19, Exhibit "S").
21.

Askew settled her claims against Kevin Butts prior to

trial. (R. 1646).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.A. The proper standard of review is that "in matters of
discovery a trial court has broad discretion which will not be
disturbed absent a showing of abuse." Brown v. Superior Court In
and For Maricopa Cy.. 670 P.2d 725, 729 (Ariz. 1983).
I.B. The trial court properly ruled that the documents in the
claim file were prepared in anticipation of litigation. The cases
cited by Askew support a per se rule that a document cannot be
13

prepared

in anticipation of litigation unless an attorney is

involved. Thomas Organ v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D.
367 (N.D.I11. 1972). However, the holding and apparent reasoning of
Thomas Organ has been considered and rejected by the Utah Supreme
Court, Gold Standard v. American Barrack Resources, Inc., 805 P.2d
164, 169 (Utah 1990).
The trial court properly applied the multi-factored approach
mandated by the Utah Supreme Court in Gold Standard in ruling that
Utah Farm Bureau's claim file was prepared in anticipation of
litigation and was, therefore, protected. R. 290-291.
In the instant case, Utah Farm Bureau's insured, Hardman,
anticipated litigation as evidenced by his call to the Utah County
Sheriff's Office and his insurance agent on the morning following
the accident. He reported a potential claim to his insurance
company and wanted the Sheriff to observe the scene immediately so
the Sheriff could later testify, if necessary, that trespassers
knocked his fences down.
Utah Farm Bureau's claims agent, Greg Johnson, testified by
affidavit that it was his experience that an accident between a
vehicle and livestock typically results in litigation. (Affidavit
of Greg Johnson, f 3, attached as Exhibit "C") . The nature of this
claim required that Utah Farm Bureau anticipate litigation from the
date of the accident.
14

With respect to the statement of Hardman (Entries 3-4 of
Exhibit "A"), the trial court properly considered that there must
be heightened protection for statements taken by representative of
an insurance company from its insureds. See Heidebrink v. Moriwaki,
706 P.2d 212, 216 (Wash. 1985).
The trial court also considered the fact that Utah Farm
Bureau's attorney, Stephen G. Morgan, instructed Greg Johnson to
take the statement from Hardman and create other documents to
assist Mr. Morgan in defending this action.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in protecting
Utah Farm Bureau's statement from discovery. The court considered
all the relevant facts, including: 1) the nature of the insurance
industry; 2) the attorney involvement of Mr. Morgan; 3) the fact
that the documents sought (the entire claim file) were not relevant
to

the

litigation;

4) the

fact

that

the

insured, Hardman,

anticipated litigation and immediately called his insurance agent
to report the potential claim and called the Sheriff to preserve
the evidence to prove that trespassers knocked his fence down; 5)
the size and nature of Askew1s claim suggested litigation was
imminent; and 6) the testimony of Mr. Greg Johnson, who indicated
that he anticipated litigation from the date of the accident. R.
110-113.
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I.e. Askew has not demonstrated substantial need for the
statement of Paul Hardman or the claim file. Paul Hardman testified
at length about the condition of the fence the morning after the
accident. R.

1804.

(Deposition of Paul Hardman, pp. 108-110

attached as Exhibit "E"). Askew also introduced the report of
Officer Jerry Monson of the Utah County Sheriff's Office prepared
the morning after the accident at the request of Hardman. R. 311
(Attached as Exhibit "F"). Finally, Mr. Robert Harmon photographed
the fence at approximately the same time he took the statement of
Hardman the morning after the accident. These documents constitute
the "substantial equivalent" of materials sought by Askew.
I.D. Askew also argues that Hardman waived the work product
privilege by testifying about matters discussed in the statement
during his deposition.

Askew has provided absolutely no support

for the proposition that one waives the work product privilege
merely by discussing

the matters contained

in the protected

documents during a deposition. The gist of Askew's argument is that
the work product privilege is waived when one testifies about the
same facts in a deposition as are in the protected statement.
However, the principles of "subject matter waiver" are inapplicable
to the work product privilege.
I.E. Assuming that the trial court erred in ruling that the
claim

file was

prepared

in anticipation
16

of

litigation

and,

therefore, protected, any such error was harmless. Most of the
documents in the claim file dealt with insurance company procedures
or the establishment of reserves and were irrelevant to the legal
issues in the matter. Moreover, many of the documents contained the
mental impressions of the adjuster for Utah Farm Bureau and were
therefore, absolutely protected. Askew was not harmed by her
inability to obtain the statement of Hardman because the jury was
well apprised of the condition of the fence by the testimony of
Hardman, the report of Officer Monson, and the photographs of the
fence the morning after the accident.
II.

Askew properly concludes that she must establish that the

trial court abused its discretion in excluding Robert Harmon as a
witness. Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P. 2d 204, 205-07 (Utah Ct. App.
1987), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). The trial court
properly balanced the concern that insurance would be injected into
the trial if Mr. Harmon was called as a witness against Askewfs
ostensible reason for calling Mr. Harmon.
III. Askew is proper in her assertion that she must establish
that the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting her from
informing the jury that she did not take the photographs. A review
of the trial court's ruling demonstrates that the trial court
properly denied Askew1s request. On the last day that evidence was
taken

(during Askew1s rebuttal), Askew requested that she be
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allowed to testify that neither she nor her representative took the
photographs. Instead, she wanted to create the impression that the
photographs were taken by a representative of Hardman. Askew's
obvious purpose was to inject insurance into the litigation. Judge
Davis properly refused to allow Askew to do so.
ARGUMENT
From the outset of this litigation, Askew has made a concerted
and overt attempt to inject into this litigation the fact that
Hardman was insured by Utah Farm Bureau. First, when discovery was
initially commenced, Askew attempted to discover Utah Farm Bureau's
entire claim file and the statement of Hardman (November 25, 1993).
The trial court (Judge George Ballif

(Retired)) ruled against

Askew. Askew then filed a motion to reconsider the ruling, which
was denied by Judge Ballif. Askew then filed an interlocutory
appeal which was denied by the Utah Supreme Court. Then, near the
close of discovery and shortly before trial, Askew sought to depose
Robert Harmon, the adjuster for Utah Farm Bureau that took the
statement of Hardman (November 16, 1992). Askew also asked the
Court for a second time to allow discovery of the claim file, this
time claiming "substantial need."

The trial court (Judge Lynn

Davis) allowed the deposition. Askew then sought to call Harmon as
a witness at trial. This request was denied by the trial court on
January 4, 1993. Finally, on the last day evidence was presented at
18

trial, during rebuttal testimony, Askew asked permission from the
Court to inform the jury that a representative of Hardman had taken
the photographs Askew entered into evidence.
The fact that the jury found Hardman not guilty of negligence
is conclusive evidence that Hardman was free from fault. Askew's
proof on the issues of negligent conduct and causation was so weak
that her only prospect for recovery from Hardman was to inject
insurance into the litigation and hope the jury would sympathize
with

her

and

award

a

substantial

amount

of

money.

Hardman

respectfully asserts that the trial court properly guarded against
Askew's relentless attempts to inject insurance into the litigation
and upheld the law of this state which mandates "that the question
of insurance is immaterial and should not be injected into the
trial; and that it is the duty of both counsel and the court to
guard against it [footnote omitted].11 Robinson v. Hreinson, 409
P.2d 121, 123 (Utah 1965).
I
THE DOCUMENTS CONTAINED IN THE INSURER'S CLAIM FILE WERE
PREPARED IN ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION AND WERE THEREFORE
PROTECTED AS WORK-PRODUCT.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The proper standard of review is that "in matters of discovery
a trial court has broad discretion which will not be disturbed
absent a showing of abuse." Brown v. Superior Court In and For
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Maricopa Cy.. 670 P.2d 725, 729 (Ariz. 1983)(case involved insurer
claim file); see also Wakabayashi v. Hertz Corp. , 660 P.2d 1309
(Hawaii 1983) . "A ruling will be reversed only when the trial court
reached a conclusion against the logic and natural inferences to be
drawn from the facts and circumstances before the court." Burr v.
United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 560 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ind. App.
1990)(case involved insurer claim file).
B. THE DOCUMENTS WERE PREPARED IN THE ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION
Perhaps it is best to first state what is not the law before
addressing the law of Utah. Askew cites several cases in support of
a per se rule that a document cannot be prepared in anticipation of
litigation unless an attorney is involved. Ballard v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Ct.. 787 P.2d 406 (Nev. 1990); Hall v. Goodwin, 775
P.2d 291 (Okla. 1989); Henry Enter, v. Smith, 592 P.2d 915 (Kan.
1979). Each of these cases stems from Thomas Organ v. Jadranska
Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D.I11. 1972), which Askew hails
as the "leading case with respect to discovery of an insurer's
claim file." (Brief of Appellant, P.26 n.12). Askew goes so far as
to call the rule espoused in Thomas Organ the "majority rule."
Other courts have found differently. For example, the District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania has found that "[t]he
Thomas Organ view has been rejected by many courts as contrary to
the intent of the 1970 Amendments" to the Federal Rules of Civil
20

Procedure. Basinaer v. Glacier Carriers. Inc., 107 F.R.D.

771

(M.D.Pa. 1985).
Moreover, the holding and apparent reasoning of Thomas Organ
have been considered and rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. Gold
Standard v. American Barrack Resources, Inc., 805 P.2d 164f 169
(Utah 1990). The Utah Supreme Court stated:
Other courts have rejected the strict approach of Thomas
Organ and have used attorney involvement as only one
factor in a more fact-specific determination of whether
material was prepared in anticipation of litigation. ...
The rule that better effectuates the language of Rule
26(b)(3), and its underlying rationale, is that attorney
involvement is only one factor to be weighed in
determining the applicability of the work product
privilege. See Moore v. Tri-City Hosp. Auth., 118 F.R.D.
646 (N.D.Ga. 1988); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure, § 2024, at 207 (1970). Moreover,
the leading treatises have rejected the Thomas Organ
approach. 4 J. Moore, J. Lucas, & G. Grotheer, Moore's
Federal Practice, f 26.64[2], at 26-360 n.23 (2d ed.
1989); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 2024, at 205-06 (1970).
Id. at 169 (emphasis added). Thus, the cases relied upon by Askew
have been rejected in Utah and the trial court properly refused to
be bound by a rule which the Utah Supreme Court refused to accept.
The trial court properly applied the multi-factored approach
mandated by the Utah Supreme Court in Gold Standard in ruling that
Utah

Farm

Bureau's claim

file was protected.

R.

290-291

(The

Court's ruling is attached as Exhibit " B " ) . First, the trial court
considered

the fact that these documents were prepared
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by an

insurance company in connection with Askew's potential claim.1 The
Court found persuasive the following language from the Eastern
District of Missouri:
[T]he anticipation of the filing of a claim is undeniable
once an accident has occurred and a person injured or
property damaged. This is especially true in today's
litigious society. Documents prepared at that time,
therefore, are clearly prepared "in anticipation of
litigation" and "by or for another . . . party's
representative."
Fontaine v.

Sunflower

Beef Carrier, Inc., 87 F.R.D.

89, 92

(E.D.Mo.1980). Another statement of this principle was made by the
Iowa Supreme Court, which stated:
In our litigious society, when an insured reports to his
insurer that he has been in an incident involving another
person, the insurer can reasonably anticipate that some
action will be taken by the other party. The seeds of
prospective litigation have been sown, and the prudent
party, anticipating this fact, will begin to prepare his
case. Although a claim may be settled short of the
institution of legal action, there is an ever-present
possibility of a claim's ending in litigation. The
recognition of this possibility provides, in any given
case, the impetus for the insurer to garner information
regarding the circumstances of a claim.
Ashmead v. Harris, 336 N.W.2d

197, 201

(Iowa 1983). Another

landmark case in this area is Almaguer v. Chicago. Rock Island &
Pacific R.R., 55 F.R.D. 147 (D.Neb.1972). In Almaguer, the District
Court for the District of Nebraska held:

1

Gold Standard did not involve an insurer's claim file, and,
therefore, the Utah Supreme Court did not consider whether an
insurer prepares its claim file in anticipation of litigation.
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The anticipation of the filing of a claim against a
railroad, when a railroad employee has been injured or
claims to have been injured on the job, is undeniable,
and the expectation of litigation in such circumstances
is a reasonable assumption.
Almaauer. 55 F.R.D. at 149; see also Firemen's Fund Insurance v.
McAlpine. 391 A.2d 84 (R.I. 1978). The Supreme Court of Alabama has
stated that

fI

[s]tate courts have generally taken the position of

Almaauer." Ex Parte State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 386 So.2d
1133, 1136 (Ala. 1980).
In the instant case, Utah Farm Bureau's insured, Hardman,
anticipated litigation as evidenced by his call to the Utah County
Sheriff's Office and his insurance agent on the morning following
the

accident.

He

wanted

the

Sheriff

to

observe

the

scene

immediately so the Sheriff could later testify, if necessary, that
trespassers

knocked

his

fences

down.

That

litigation

was

anticipated is further evidenced by his statement to the Sheriff:
Action Taken: RP [Reporting Party/Hardman] wanted to show
R/D [Reporting Deputy] the fence because he is afraid of
being suied [sic] for having his horse cause an accident.
R. 311. (Utah County Offense Report, Exhibit "F"). Moreover, at
trial, Officer Monson testified:
Q. (BY MR. MORGAN) Do you recall him telling you that,
"It's not my fault?"
A. Yes.
(Monson Transcript, p. 18, Exhibit "L").
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Not only did Hardman anticipate litigation, but his insurer,
Utah Farm Bureau, also anticipated litigation as soon as Hardman
reported the potential claim on the morning following the accident.
At the time, Askew was in a coma and her family was concerned for
her survival. Hardman's insurance policy would have covered only a
fraction of the anticipated medical expenses even if Hardman was
found negligent. The initial investigation demonstrated that in
Utah Farm Bureau's judgment, there was no liability on the part of
Hardman because the actions of trespassers caused the horse to
escape. Under these circumstances, Utah Farm Bureau would have been
negligent in carrying out its duty to its insured if it failed to
anticipate litigation.
These very factors led the Alabama Supreme Court to protect
statements taken in anticipation of litigation. Ex Parte State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 386 So.2d 1133 (Ala.1980). There, a State Farm
insured permitted another to use his vehicle. The permissive driver
killed the plaintiff's decedent. As part of its investigation,
State Farm's claim representative took seven statements from
witnesses to the accident. The plaintiff sought to discover these
statements. In denying plaintiff's request, the Supreme Court of
Alabama perceptively noted:
In this case, State Farm's claims specialist testified,
by affidavit, that from the very outset of his
investigation, it was obvious to him that State Farm's
insured was free from liability, and that he prepared all
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of the documents for eventual litigation. Even though
State Farm did not turn over its file to its attorney
until after the lawsuit was filed in September, we opine,
from the meager evidence in the record, that the
investigation
was
conducted
in anticipation
of
litigation. From the nature of the case, a death claim.
State Farm's agent could have reasonably concluded that
its insured would be sued. This was not the type of
fender-bender where a settlement with the insured would
likely occur without a lawsuit.
Id. at 1136 (emphasis added) . Utah Farm Bureau was in a similar
position. This Court should hold that an adjuster is warranted in
investigating a claim in anticipation of litigation when every
single fact and all of the adjuster's experience tells him that
litigation should not only be anticipated, but is certain to occur.
Here, Utah Farm Bureau's claims agent, Greg Johnson, testified
by affidavit that it was his experience that an accident between a
vehicle and livestock typically results in litigation which must be
prepared for:
3. As Claims Manager, I have established a procedure for
handling claims involving livestock on the highway. It
has been my experience that once a claim is reported that
involves livestock on the highway which is allegedly
owned by a Utah Farm Bureau insured, I anticipate from
that time forward that a claim may be filed in connection
with the accident by the insured, or the driver or
occupants of the vehicle that came in contact with the
livestock.
R. 112 (Affidavit of Greg Johnson, f 3, attached as Exhibit "C").
This is in accordance with rule 26, which protects documents
prepared "by or for that other party's representatives (including
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his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent)."
Utah R.Civ.P. 26.
With respect to the statement of Hardman (Entries 3-4 of
Exhibit "A"), the trial court properly considered that there must
be heightened protection for statements taken by an insurance
company from its insured. The Supreme Court of Washington expressed
the delicate public policy concerns which mandate heightened
protection of statements between insureds and insurers as follows:
An insured is contractually obligated to cooperate with
the insurance company.
Such an obligation creates a
reasonable expectation that the contents of statements
made by the insured will not be revealed to the opposing
party. The insurer, on the other hand, has a contractual
obligation to act as the insured's agent and secure an
attorney. The insured cannot choose the attorney but can
expect the agent to transmit the statement to the
attorney so selected.
Without an expectation of
confidentiality, an insured may be hesitant to disclose
everything known.
Such non-disclosure could hinder
representation by its selected attorney.
Heidebrink v. Moriwaki, 706 P.2d 212, 216 (Wash. 1985).
The trial court also considered the fact that Utah Farm
Bureau's attorney, Stephen G. Morgan, instructed Greg Johnson to
take the statement from Hardman and create other documents to
assist Mr. Morgan in preparing to defend this action. In September,
1986, Mr. Morgan sent Utah Farm Bureau a letter instructing him to
have the insured prepare certain documents and that Utah Farm
Bureau should take any statements which it deemed necessary to
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prepare Mr. Morgan for litigation. R. 115-119 (attached as Exhibit
"D") .
Askew claims that these letters should not be used to protect
documents prepared three years later. Askew misses the point of
these letters and their import in this matter. The documents which
Mr. Morgan instructed Utah Farm Bureau to create are not created in
the ordinary course of business. Instead, they are created to
assist Mr. Morgan in his defense of the claim should the matter
proceed to trial.

The claim's adjuster is certainly able to

resolve a simple claim without the use of these documents. However,
when the matter proceeds to litigation, the attorney needs these
documents in order to defend the claim.
Askew's proposed rule mandating attorney involvement ignores
the realities of the insurance industry. From the date of the
accident, the relationship between the claimant and the alleged
tort-feasor's insurer is adversarial. The claimant will try to
maximize his or her recovery. The insurer will try to limit its
exposure. At any time, the claimant can sue the tort-feasor or the
insurance company can force the claimant to sue by refusing to pay.
Indeed, a liability insurance company is generally under no duty to
settle or pay a claim until the tort-feasor is found negligent and
a judgment entered against the insured.
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion in protecting
Utah Farm Bureau's statement from discovery. The court considered
all the relevant facts, including: 1) the nature of the insurance
industry; 2) the attorney involvement of Mr. Morgan; 3) the fact
that the documents sought (the entire claim file) were not relevant
to

the

litigation;

4) the

fact

that

the

insured, Hardman,

anticipated litigation; 5) the size and nature of Askew's claim
suggested litigation was imminent; and 6) the testimony of Mr. Greg
Johnson, who indicated that he anticipated litigation from the date
of the accident.
Recall that the original protective order was entered by Judge
George Ballif (retired) . At the close of discovery, Askew made a
second motion to compel seeking the tape recording of the statement
and claiming "substantial need." Judge Davis ruled:
Plaintiff's motion to compel, I believe frankly, that
there is some expectation of confidentiality. I believe
there's a public policy argument that's a persuasive one.
I also believe that while it may not have been
anticipated by Judge Ballif of a broad protective order
that would go to the issue of the tape or transcript of
the tape, it certainly appears that since that time there
has been no additional —well, I'll state it as an
inadequate showing of substantial need.
There is a work product involved that ought to be
protected. Courts are granted broad discretion on these
issues, weighing the facts involved and sort of the civil
counterpart of a totality of the circumstances involved,
and granted broad discretion under Rule 26(b)3 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to weigh those facts and
make a determination.
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(Transcript of December 28, 1992, hearing, p. 3, attached as
Exhibit "H"). Two trial judges, each applying their discretion and
considerable experience gained from the bench, have considered
Askew's request for the claim file and both have rejected the same.
Askew may not agree with the trial court's conclusion, but the
ruling was not "against the logic and natural inference to be drawn
from the facts and circumstances before the court." Burr v. United
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 560 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (111.App. 1990) .
The trial court's ruling should be affirmed.
C.

ASKEW DID NOT HAVE A "SUBSTANTIAL NEED" FOR THE STATEMENT OP
HARDMAN.
Askew claims that even if the statement of Hardman was

prepared

in anticipation

of litigation, she was entitled to

discover the statement because she had demonstrated "substantial
need."

The burden rests with Askew to show substantial need and

undue hardship. Toledo Edison Co. v. G.A. Technologies, Inc., 847
F.2d 335, 340 (6th Cir. 1988) (cited with approval in Gold Standard
v. American Resources, 805 P.2d 164 (Utah 1991)).
The essence of Askew's argument is that only three witnesses
observed the pasture and the fence the morning after the accident—
Robert Harmon, Officer Jerry Monson, and Hardman. It is claimed by
Askew in order to advance her argument that neither of the latter
two witnesses had a good recollection of the condition of the fence
the morning after the accident, and that Mr. Harmon was precluded
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from testifying by the trial court. Askew thus claims a substantial
need for the "contemporaneous" statement of Hardman. However, as
demonstrated in this brief, Askew was provided with a multitude of
evidence which conclusively established the condition of the fence
and surrounding area the morning after the accident.
First, Mr. Hardman testified at length and in great detail
regarding the condition

of the fence the morning

after the

accident. As an example, Mr. Hardman testified as follows in his
deposition:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

And you recall — where I believe you testified that the
wire had been taken off the corner?
Yes.
And that was the same as a couple of weeks earlier the
wire had been taken off the corner post?
Yes.
How many wires had been taken off the corner post?
Two.
Is that the number of wires that ran along the north
fence?
Yes.
When you put the fence up on the morning of the 21st of
November, tell me how you did that?
I just pulled it to the corner post and wired it on.
With your hands?
Yes.
Did you wire —
As I remember, I did.
Do you recall whether wired — well, first, let me ask
this. How much of the fence had been taken down?
Probably three poles, two or — from the corner, probably
three steel posts. It was all drooping. But I mean, you
know, laying on the ground, as I recall, there were maybe
three poles.
Three posts along there?
Yes. Three posts.
So the wire had been pulled off three posts?
Yeah.
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Would that be including the corner post or the corner
post and —
No. That doesn't include the corner post.
— three more. Were the posts bent?
No.
Did you observe whether the wire that had wired the
barbed wire to the post had been cut?
No I didn't.
Did you observe whether it had been undone?
No. Didn't find that wire.
Did you look for it?
No. Well, when I pulled that back, I looked for the wire
to wire it back to the post, but I didn't —
You didn't see the wire lying there on the ground or
anything?
Did not see the wire lying on the ground, no.

R. 1804 (Hardman Depo., pp. 108-110, Exhibit "E"). Hardman had a
very good recollection of the condition of the fence and the
surrounding area the morning after the accident.
The second witness, Officer Jerry Monson, concededly could not
recall the exact condition of the fence during his deposition.
However, Officer Monson's detailed report completed the morning
after the accident was produced to Askew. In his report, Officer
Monson stated:
R/D responded to scene with the RP and observed where the
fence was down. It appeared someone had knocked the
fence down with a full sized pickup truck, as there was
old tire tracks near the fence. Also, R/D observed where
a deer had recently been poached on the RP's property.
R. 311 (Utah County's Sheriff's Report, Exhibit "F"). Thus, while
Mr. Monson may not have been able to recall the exact condition of
the fence during his deposition, Askew has already been provided
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with the prized "contemporaneous" statement of Mr. Monson in the
form of his report.
Finally,

Mr.

Robert

Harmon

photographed

the

fence

at

approximately the same time as he took the statement of Hardman—
the morning after the accident. Hardman testified at trial that the
photographs fairly depict the condition of the fence as observed
the morning after the accident. (Transcript of Hardman, pp. 68,
Exhibit "G"). Hardman testified similarly with respect to other
pictures taken the morning after the accident. The notes of the
investigating officer, David Guest, dated December 7, 1989, which
was 17 days after the accident, reflect the following concerning
the photographs:
Called Paul Hardman—He said he hadn't heard anything yet
and he said that the day after he went to the field where
the horses were and the fence was down and he went home
and called the sheriff's office. A Deputy came and found
a fresh deer kill and took pictures of vehicle tracks
crossing the fence.
R. 1818. These photographs qualify as the "substantial equivalent"
of what Askew hoped to obtain from the statement of Hardman. The
photographs show the exact condition of the fence the morning after
the accident.
Judge Davis considered all of these elements in ruling that
Askew had failed to demonstrate "substantial need":
There must be a showing of substantial need and the
plaintiff is unable to obtain a substantial equivalent of
the evidence contained within that particular recording.
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This court is aware of the standard announced both
in Mower and also the Gold Standard cases, and believes
that there is a substantial equivalent. One, in the
written record of deputy Jerry Monson, albeit somewhat
abbreviated, and while he has no independent recollection
of this date of some of the facts involved, there is a
written record.
Secondarily, there has been a long deposition of the
defendant involved that's been demonstrated somewhat in
excess of 200 pages. The inquiry regarding quote un,
quote, "contemporary statements" made the following
morning to a representative of the insurance adjuster are
fairly detailed in the estimation of this court.
Despite that ruling, defendants have supplied
plaintiffs with seven photographs that were taken on that
particular morning.
(Transcript of December 28, 1992, hearing, pp. 37-38, attached as
Exhibit "H").
information.

Under Rule 26(b)(3), Askew is not entitled to exact
Rather, Askew

is entitled to the

"substantial

equivalent" of the materials she seeks. Gold Standard v. American
Barrack Resources, Inc., 801 P.2d 909, 910 (Utah 1990). This is
what she was provided.
Finally, Askew argues that she is entitled to the statement of
Hardman because courts have

"recognized

that

contemporaneous

statements . . . constitute 'unique catalysts in the search for
truth1 and have accordingly ordered production of such statements."
(Brief of Appellant, p. 36). Askew relies upon Professor Moore's
treatise and the treatise of Professors Wright and Miller to
support this proposition. However, Professors Wright and Miller
have also stated that "it will be true that discovery of work
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product material will be denied if the party seeking discovery can
obtain the information he desires by taking the depositions of
witnesses.11 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, at § 2025 (1970). Likewise, in
Hamilton v. Canal Bridge Co. , 395 F.Supp. 975, 978 (E.D.La. 1974),
a case relied upon by Askew, the Court held:
If a witness were available, the court might then require
counsel to depose him and demonstrate to the Court with
some specificity just why they expect his statement to
supply information his deposition did not.
Askew1s

Id.

own

authorities

suggest

that

while

statements

contemporaneous with the accident are important, production should
not be required if the party is able to be deposed.
Essentially, Askew argues that statements should always be
produced because of the close proximity between the accident and
the statement. The trouble with this argument is that it would
render Rule 26(b)(3) meaningless. A party would always be entitled
to such materials even though they are protected as work product
because the statement by its very "contemporaneous" nature will be
taken prior to the deposition. As the Washington Supreme Court
held:
Although the statement was taken two days after the
accident, the passage of time alone is insufficient to
allow discovery. Respondents have failed to show any
other extenuating circumstances justifying disclosure.
Hence, the passage of time in the instant case fails to
carry the day. Rather the more important fact is that
the statement in question is that of the Defendant. He
is not unavailable; in fact it was in his deposition that
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the conflict arose. There is no claim that he has no
present recollection of the events in question.
Heidebrink v. Moriwaki. 706 P.2d 212f 218-19 (Wash. 1985). It has
also been stated:
The unique value of contemporaneous statements has
repeatedly been recognized. . . . Such statements have
been referred to as "unique catalysts in the search for
truth." . . . It is equally settled, however, that mere
speculation or hope that the requested statement may
prove to be contradictory or impeaching is not sufficient
to overcome the limited privilege applicable to trial
preparation materials. Stephens Produce Co. . Inc. v.
N.L.R.B. . 515 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1975); Hauaer v.
Chicago. Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 216 F.2d 501, 508
(7th Cir. 1954).
In balancing these conflicting considerations, this
Court concludes that it is necessary for plaintiff to
show more than the mere contemporaneousness of the
requested statements.
Fontaine v. Sunflower Beef Carrier.

Inc., 87 F.R.D.

89, 93

(E.D.Mo.1980).
Moreover,

in making

the

substantial

need determination,

"attention is directed at alternative means of acquiring the
information that are less intrusive to the lawyer's work and
whether or not the information might have been furnished in other
ways." Toledo Edison Co. v. G.A. Technologies. Inc.. 847 F.2d 335,
340 (6th Cir. 1988). Allowing Askew to depose Hardman, obtain the
photographs taken of the fence, and receive Officer Monson's report
were certainly less intrusive than requiring production of the
statement and allowed Askew to obtain the information she sought.
Askew was provided with the

"substantial
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equivalent" of the

materials she seeks. Thus, Askew did not have a "substantial need"
for Hardman's statement.
D.

HARDMAN DID NOT WAIVE THE ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE.
Askew also argues that Hardman waived

the work product

privilege by testifying about matters discussed in the statement
during his deposition.

Askew has provided absolutely no support

for the proposition that one waives the work product privilege
merely

by discussing the matters contained

in the protected

documents during a deposition.
The gist of Askew1 s argument

is that the work

product

privilege is waived when one testifies about the same facts in a
deposition as in the protected statement. In other words, the
principle of "subject matter" waiver applies equally to both the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege. This is
contrary to established legal principles which hold:
Work product doctrine is a source of immunity separate
and distinct from the attorney-client privilege, so that
a waiver of the latter privilege does not necessarily
mean that the protection afforded by the work product
doctrine is also breached.
10

Fed.

Proc,

Discovery

and

Depositions,

Additionally, it has been held that:

§ 26:113

(1988).

"A waiver of the attorney-

client privilege does not affect the protection

against the

disclosure of the "work product" of an attorney."

Annotation,
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Development Since Hickman v. Taylor of Attorneys "Work Product"
Doctrine, 35 A.L.R.3d 412, 485 (1971).
More specifically, Askew1s notion of "subject matter waiver"
is inapplicable to the work product privilege. The general rule is
that "the broad concepts of subject matter waiver analogous to
those

applicable

to

claims

of attorney-client

privilege

inappropriate when applied to work product materials."

are

10 Fed.

Proc, Discovery and Depositions, § 26:114 (1988).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has likewise held:
Thus, to the extent that a concept of subject matter
waiver is applicable to Rule 26(b)(3) . . . it does not
extend to a case such as this where there has only been
inadvertent or partial disclosure in response to specific
inquiries, and in which no testimonial use has been made
of the work product.
Duplan Corp. v. Peering Millikan. Inc., 540 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir.
1976). Thus, there is no support for Askew1s contention that the
work product privilege may be waived in the same manner that the
attorney-client privilege is waived.
Rule

26(b)(3) would

be

rendered

meaningless

if Askew's

proposed rule were accepted. If Hardman refused to testify about
the factual matters he also testified to in the statement, Askew
would have the "substantial need" she seeks and would claim an
entitlement to the statement. But when Hardman testified about the
matters in his deposition, Askew claimed waiver and an entitlement
to the statement. Askew claims "substantial need" if Hardman is not
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deposed, and waiver if he is. In order to give Rule 26(b)(3) full
effect, a party must be permitted to protect a statement taken in
anticipation of litigation and fully testify about his factual
knowledge.2
Askew's position is not supported by any case law or other
authority. Before Askew's argument is accepted as law, Askew
should, at the very least, be required to show that her argument is
"warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal

of existing law. . .." Utah

R. Civ. P. 11. The rules of procedure governing this state require
no less.
E. THE FAILURE OP THE COURT TO ORDER PRODUCTION OP THE CLAIM PILE
WAS HARMLESS ERROR.
Assuming that the trial court erred in ruling that the claim
file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and, therefore,
protected, any such error was harmless. Rule 61 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure mandates that this Court ignore any error which
"does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Utah

2

Moreover, Askew's argument creates a tremendous weapon for
the party seeking to prevent discovery. The attorney for that party
could take statements from all material witnesses and then prevent
those witnesses from giving their depositions or testifying about
the same "subject matter" at trial in order to prevent waiver.
Clearly, the goal of full factual discovery would be destroyed
under Askew1s proposed rule. To further all goals, the party must
be allowed to protect the document but fully testify as to his or
her factual knowledge.
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R.Civ.P. 61. Interpreting this rule, the Utah Supreme Court has
placed "upon an appellant the burden of showing not only that an
error occurred, but that it was substantial and prejudicial in that
the appellant was deprived in some manner of a full and fair
consideration of the disputed issues by the jury." Ashton v.
Ashton. 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987).
The most important principle in this regard is that this Court
should "exercise every reasonable presumption in favor of the
validity of a general verdict." Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v.
Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982). The Utah Supreme Court has
also stated that "an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a
different

outcome

is sufficiently

high

as to undermine

our

confidence in the verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d
789 (Utah 1991).
Preventing Askew from discovering the insurer's claim file did
not undermine confidence in the verdict and did not affect Askew1s
substantive rights. Attached as Exhibit "A" is a detailed summary
of the documents contained in the insurer's claim file. R. 121-122.
This document was also presented to the trial court in connection
with Hardman's motion for a protective order.

Obviously, any

documents created after the January 17, 1991, letter from Mark
James, Askew's attorney, to Robert Harmon (Entry 23) are protected
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under the anticipation of litigation doctrine. Thus, at issue are
entries 1-22.
The vast majority of the documents are status reports and
inter-office correspondence. (Entries 5, 7, 13, (11 & 15) 3 16-22).
These documents contain the mental impressions, conclusions, and
opinions of Utah Farm Bureau's claim's adjuster, Greg Johnson, and
pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are
absolutely protected. Mower v. McCarthy, 245 P.2d 224 (Utah 1952).
See R. Ill (Affidavit of Greg Johnson, 5 6, attached as Exhibit
"C") .
The second class of documents were as easily obtainable by
Askew as Utah Farm Bureau. They include:
6.
9.
10.
12.

Investigating Officer's report.
Copy of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-38.
Copy of Utah Farm and Ranch Law—Animals on Highway.
Handwritten
note on Horse with Certificate of
Registration on Horse.

These documents could have been obtained by Askew at any law
library or, in the case of the Investigating Officer's report, by
contacting the appropriate governmental agency. As such, Askew
cannot complain that she did not have the opportunity to discover
these documents.
3

The reserve is the estimated amount needed by the insurer to
resolve a contingent liability. The establishment of reserves
necessarily involves an opinion and mental impression regarding the
value of the case and the potential of prevailing at trial.
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The final class of documents deal with insurance company
computer documents and contain no facts relevant to this lawsuit:
1.
2.
8.
14.

Computer print-out on policy information
Report of Claim
Copy of Check
Copy of Check

It is doubtful that any of these documents would have been
relevant to the issue of Hardman's negligence and most would not
have been admitted at trial for the same reason. These documents
also would not have been admitted because to do so would inject
insurance into the litigation, thereby prejudicing Hardman.
Askew has the burden of demonstrating to this Court that but
for the trial court's alleged error, she would have prevailed at
trial. She has not even attempted to meet this burden in her Brief
of Appellant.
The only other document in the claim file was the tape of the
recorded statement (and subsequent transcription of the statement)
which the insurance agent, Robert Harmon, obtained

from the

insured, Hardman, on the morning following the accident. Any error
relating to the production of the tape and statement of Hardman was
likewise harmless. Askew sought the tape and statement of Hardman
for the purpose of injecting insurance into the trial and to show
the jury the condition of the fence and surrounding pasture the
morning after the accident. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 32-33). But
the jury was already given an exact picture of the condition of the
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fence the morning after the accident through the photographs taken
the morning after the accident and Officer Jerry Monson's report,
also completed the morning after the accident, both of which were
entered into evidence. The report stated:
R/D [reporting deputy] responded to scene with the RP
[reporting party] and observed where the fence was down.
It appeared someone had knocked the fence down with a
full sized pickup truck, as there was old tire tracks
near the fence. Also, R/D observed where a deer had
recently been poached on the RP's property.
R. 311 (Utah County Offense Report, Exhibit

lf

F") . The photographs

taken by Mr. Robert Harmon the morning after the accident showed
the exact condition of the fence. Additionally, Hardman was crossexamined by Askew and he gave a detailed description of the
condition of the fence the morning after the accident.
There was also testimony at trial as to the condition of the
fence before the accident. Paul Hardman testified that he checked
the fence on the very evening the accident occurred:
Q. Were the posts and wire in place on November 20, 1989,
at 4:30 p.m. when you last saw it prior to the accident?
A. Yes, sir.
(Hardman Transcript, p. 4, Exhibit "R"). In addition, Doug Smith
testified that he repaired the fence about four weeks before the
accident:
Q. Were you asked to do some repairs to Paul Hardman's
fence in 1989?
A. Yes, sir, I was.
Q. How long before that accident would it have been that
you would have made the repairs to Mr. Hardman's fence?
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A. Well, I don't know exactly. I don't remember the date
exactly, but it was in latter part of October or early
November.
Q. Did you do whatever you felt you needed to do to make
it an adequate fence to contain horses?
A. I did.
Q. And in your opinion it was?
A. Yes, sir, it was. It was adequate before I repaired
it. I don't think they could have ever got out.
* * *

Q. When you finished doing your work, what do you recall
in terms of the height of the lower wire and the height
of the upper wire along the north side of the pasture?
A. I would say that somewhere the lower wire is 18 inches
to two feet, somewhere in that vicinity. The upper wire
would have been three and a half to four feet.
Q. Do you know what kind of fence you need build in order
to keep trespassers out?
A. There is no kind of fence you can build to keep
trespassers out.
Q. Is a two strand barbed wire fence standard or normal
in Utah County to contain horses?
A. Yes, it is. There's a lot of one wire also.
(Smith Transcript, pp. 7-8, 16-17, Exhibit "J").
The jury was well apprised of the condition of the fence the
morning after the accident.

Askew's counsel showed the jury time

and again the condition of the fence the morning after the accident
as depicted in the photographs. Her counsel questioned Hardman at
length regarding the condition of the fence. Now Askew claims that
she was denied a fair trial because she was not allowed to show the
jury the condition of the fence for the "umpteenth" time. Simply
put, a party is not denied a fair trial because she was only
allowed to present the same evidence four times but not five.
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Hardman respectfully asserts that the failure to admit the
statement should not "undermine [this Court's] confidence in the
verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P. 2d 789, 796 (Utah
1991). Thus, the verdict should be upheld.
F. CONCLUSION
In the Brief of Appellant, Askew understates her burden, which
is two-fold. First, she must establish that the trial court abused
its discretion

in ruling that the claim

file was prepared

in

anticipation of litigation. This requires a showing that the trial
court's holding was "against the logic and natural inferences to be
drawn from the facts and circumstances before the court." Burr v.
United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 560 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ind. App.
1990) . Assuming
demonstrate

that

she

can

"the

carry

likelihood

this
of

burden,
a

she

different

must

still

outcome

is

sufficiently high as to undermine our confidence in the verdict."
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
Askew has not even attempted to show that the trial court
abused its discretion by applying the Gold Standard principles to
the claim

file, nor has she demonstrated

that she would

have

prevailed at trial if she would have discovered the claim file.
II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED ROBERT HARMON AS A
WITNESS IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE INJECTION OF INSURANCE
INTO THE ACTION
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A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
Askew properly concludes that she must establish that the
trial court abused its discretion in excluding Robert Harmon as a
witness. Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204, 205-07 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) , cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988) . However, she has not
presented any facts which suggest that the trial court abused its
discretion. The trial court properly excluded Mr. Harmon as a
witness in order to avoid the danger of injecting insurance into
the trial. The general rule that insurance covering the defendant
should not be injected into the trial is so well accepted that it
has been adopted as Rule 411 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Reeves
v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111, 121 (Utah 1991); Tias v. Proctor. 591
P.2d 438, 440 (Utah 1979).
The trial court properly balanced the concern that insurance
would be injected into the trial if Mr. Harmon was called as a
witness against Askew1s ostensible reason for calling Mr. Harmon.
Judge Davis stated as follows in ruling on the matter:
THE COURT: Well, then you're essentially opening up the
flood gates so that you can subpoena any insurance agent
or insurance adjustor or investigator for an insurance
company and—
I believe a line of cases still support the fact
that ultimately it can be prejudicial or may be,
particularly in a case where we're not talking about an
auto accident where there's some reasonable reflection
upon insurance but liability insurance that attaches to
a farmer with some property in a fairly remote area and
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a variety of things that way. I think the reasoning may
be more persuasive if we had two automobiles.
(Transcript of January 4, 1993, pp. 12-13, attached as Exhibit
"H"). Judge Davis went on to state:
THE COURT: I'll grant your Motion to Quash. It's left
with the sound discretion of the Court.
I believe that there's—the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the possibility of prejudice
or interjection of issues of insurance into the case,
which ultimately can either elevate awards or at least
may have that possibility.
It also appears to the Court that the testimony
would be cumulative. Still have an officer or a trooper
that was there—no. Let's see. Excuse me. It's a Deputy
County Sheriff that was present on that morning, who made
a report, plus a defendant himself who was present on
that occasion. So I'll grant your Motion to Quash.
(Transcript of January 4, 1993, p. 14, Exhibit "M").
The trial court found that the danger of injecting insurance
into the litigation was to be avoided at all costs. Askew's
ostensible reason for calling Mr. Harmon was to confirm the
condition of the fence the morning after the accident, a condition
conclusively established by the testimony of Hardman, Officer
Monson, and by the photographs taken by Mr. Harmon the morning
after the accident.
Askew claims in her brief that Harmon's testimony concerning
the condition of the fence was needed because it was inconsistent
with the testimony of Hardman and, therefore, diminished the
credibility of Hardman. (Brief of Appellant, note 25) . However,
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Askew did not demonstrate any difference in her brief between the
testimony of Hardman and Harmon regarding the condition of the
fence the morning after the accident. Indeed, the only alleged
difference cited in Askew's brief dealt with the location of the
deer "entrails," not the condition of the fence. Id. (Harmon
testified in his deposition that the entrails were "inside" the
pasture, which is essentially the same testimony given by Officer
Monson who testified that the entrails were in the vicinity of
where the fence was down; Hardman, on the other hand, testified
that the entrails were a quarter mile from where the fence was
down).
Since Mr. Harmon's testimony was cumulative and unnecessary,
there was no need to risk the injection of insurance into the
litigation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
preventing Askew from calling Mr. Harmon as a witness.
B. EVEN IF IMPROPER, THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WAS HARMLESS.
Moreover, even if erroneous, the failure to allow Askew to
call Mr. Harmon as a witness was harmless error. The jury was well
apprised of the condition of the fence the morning after the
accident. Because the jury would have had the same impression of
the fence even if Mr. Harmon testified, any error in excluding him
as a witness was harmless. Askew has not shown that "the likelihood
of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine our
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confidence in the verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d
789 (Utah 1991). The verdict should be affirmed.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING
TO ALLOW ASKEW TO TESTIFY (1) THAT NEITHER SHE NOR HER
REPRESENTATIVE TOOK THE PHOTOGRAPHS OR (2) ABOUT THE
ORIGIN OR THE PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY ROBERT HARMON.
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY.
Askew is proper in her assertion that she must establish that
the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting her from
informing the jury that she did not take the photographs. But she
does not attempt to meet this burden. Instead, she states in
conclusory fashion that the ruling "was erroneous and prejudicial
to Askew's

case." For

obvious

reasons, such

unsubstantiated

statements should not form the basis for a reversal.
A review of the trial court's ruling demonstrates that the
trial court properly denied Askew's request. On the last day that
evidence was taken (during Askew1s rebuttal), Askew requested that
she be allowed to testify that neither she nor her representative
took the photographs. Instead, she wanted to create the impression
that the photographs were taken by a representative of Hardman.
Askew1s

obvious

purpose

was

to
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inject

insurance

into

the

litigation.4 Judge Davis properly refused to allow Askew to do so.
The Court ruled as follows:
THE COURT: I thought I ruled on that. I said that it
would be too prejudicial, and the issue of insurance—I
don't want to risk a mistrial in this case seven days
into the trial.
(Transcript of January 13, 1993, attached as Exhibit "I").
The identity of the individual taking the photographs was not
relevant. What was material was that the photographs fairly
depicted the condition of the fence on the morning after the
accident. (Transcript of Hardman, pp. 68, attached as Exhibit "G") .
As with other aspects of this litigation, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it weighed the danger that insurance
would be injected into the trial against Askew1s minimal need to
inform

the

jury

that

a

representative

of

Hardman

took the

photographs. Judge Davis1 consideration of this issue evidences a
sincere effort to weigh the potential prejudice to Hardman if

4

Askew's desperate attempt to inject insurance into the
litigation was apparent during rebuttal. Askew spent six days
presenting her case to the jury. Hardman spent only a day and a
half presenting his defense. Askew then sought to call some ten
witnesses in rebuttal, including a second livestock expert which
was never revealed to Hardman prior to trial. Askew realized
before rebuttal that her case regarding liability was weak. To
compensate for this weakness, Askew employed every conceivable
device in an attempt to inform the jury of insurance. If, as Askew
contends, the trial court took extreme steps to prevent the
injection of insurance, it was only because such extreme steps were
necessary to counter Askew's relentless attempts to inject
insurance into the trial.
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insurance

was

injected

into

the

litigation

against

Askew's

purported need for the testimony.
B. ANY ERROR IN EXCLUDING THIS TESTIMONY WAS HARMLESS.
Again, Askew has the burden of showing that "the likelihood of
a different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine our
confidence in the verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch,, 817 P.2d
789 (Utah 1991). Any error in this regard was harmless because the
issue was not the identity of the photographer, but whether or not
the photographs accurately depicted the condition of the fence.
This was conclusively established at trial.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Hardman respectfully requests
that all rulings of the trial court and the jury verdict be
affirmed.
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